Service Quality on Online Platforms: Empirical Evidence about Driving Quality at Uber

62 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2019 Last revised: 21 Feb 2025

See all articles by Susan Athey

Susan Athey

Stanford University

Juan Camilo Castillo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Bharat Chandar

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: February 20, 2025

Abstract

Online marketplaces have adopted new quality control mechanisms that can accommodate a flexible pool of providers. In the context of ride-hailing, we measure the effectiveness of these mechanisms, which include ratings, incentives, and behavioral nudges. Using telemetry data as an objective measure of quality, we find that drivers not only respond to user preferences but also improve their behavior after receiving warnings about their low ratings. Furthermore, we use data from a randomized experiment to show that informing drivers about their past behavior improves quality, especially for low-performing drivers. Lastly, we find that UberX drivers exhibit behavior comparable to that of UberTaxi drivers, suggesting that Uber’s new quality control mechanisms successfully maintain a high level of service quality.

Keywords: Online Platforms, Ride Hailing, Reputation Systems, Nudges, Driving Quality, Telemetry Data

JEL Classification: L91, D83, O33

Suggested Citation

Athey, Susan and Castillo, Juan Camilo and Chandar, Bharat, Service Quality on Online Platforms: Empirical Evidence about Driving Quality at Uber (February 20, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3499781 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3499781

Susan Athey

Stanford University ( email )

367 Panama St
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Juan Camilo Castillo (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jc-castillo.net

Bharat Chandar

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

Stanford, CA
United States

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