Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis

Posted: 10 Dec 2019 Last revised: 20 Feb 2024

See all articles by Armenak Antinyan

Armenak Antinyan

Wenlan School of Business; Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School

Zareh Asatryan

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2024

Abstract

Governments increasingly use nudges to improve tax collection. We synthesize the growing literature that evaluates nudging experiments using meta-analytical methods. We find that simple reminders increase the probability of compliance by 2.7 percentage points relative to the baseline where about a quarter of taxpayers are compliant. Nudges that commonly refer to elements of tax morale increase compliance by another 1.4 percentage points. Deterrence nudges, which inform taxpayers about enforcement parameters, increase compliance the most, amounting to an additional 3.2 percentage points increase on top of reminders. Our additional findings highlight some of the conditions where nudges are more effective, such as their potential when targeting sub-population of late-payers, and also suggest that even this sample of randomized trials may be susceptible to selective reporting of results. Overall, our findings imply that taxpayers are biased by various informational and behavioral constraints, and that nudges can be of some help in overcoming these frictions.

Keywords: Tax compliance, Tax evasion, Randomized control trials, Nudging, Reminders, Tax morale, Deterrence, Meta-analysis, Publication selection bias

JEL Classification: C93, D91, H26

Suggested Citation

Antinyan, Armenak and Asatryan, Zareh, Nudging for Tax Compliance: A Meta-Analysis ( 2024). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 19-055, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3500744 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3500744

Armenak Antinyan (Contact Author)

Wenlan School of Business ( email )

No.143, Wuluo Road
Wuhan, Hubei 430073
China

Cardiff University - Cardiff Business School ( email )

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Colum Drive
Cardiff, CF10 3EU
United Kingdom

Zareh Asatryan

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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