Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion after the Facebook Decision

BOTTA M., WIEDEMANN K., (2019), "Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion after the Facebook Decision." Journal of European Competition Law Practice: 1-14

33 Pages Posted: 6 Jan 2020

See all articles by Marco Botta

Marco Botta

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Klaus Wiedemann

Max Planck Law Network - Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Date Written: December 9, 2019

Abstract

- The recent interim ruling of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court in the Facebook case shows the difficulties that a competition authority might face when it comes to sanctioning exploitative abuses in digital markets.

- Rather than adopting infringement decisions, competition agencies should conclude behavioural commitments with the dominant online platform.

- Competition authorities may borrow from the European data protection regime a number of behavioural remedies to tackle forms of privacy degradation unilaterally imposed by online platforms.

Suggested Citation

Botta, Marco and Botta, Marco and Wiedemann, Klaus, Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion after the Facebook Decision (December 9, 2019). BOTTA M., WIEDEMANN K., (2019), "Exploitative Conducts in Digital Markets: Time for a Discussion after the Facebook Decision." Journal of European Competition Law Practice: 1-14, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3500996 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3500996

Marco Botta (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Klaus Wiedemann

Max Planck Law Network - Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

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