Theory of the Nudnik: The Future of Consumer Activism and What We Can Do to Stop it
59 Pages Posted: 31 Dec 2019 Last revised: 18 May 2020
Date Written: December 9, 2019
How do consumers hold sellers accountable and enforce market norms? This Article contributes to our understanding of consumer markets in three ways. First, The Article identifies the role of a small subset of consumers — the titular ‘nudniks’ — as engines of market discipline. Nudniks are those who call to complain, speak with managers, post online reviews, and file lawsuits. Typified by an idiosyncratic utility function and personality traits, nudniks pursue action where most consumers remain passive. Although derided in courtrooms and the court of public opinion, we show that nudniks can solve consumer collective action problems, thereby leading to broad market improvements.
Second, the Article spotlights a disconcerting development: Sellers’ growing usage of Big Data and predictive analytics allows them to identify specific consumers as potential nudniks and avoid selling to or disarm them before they can draw attention to sellers’ misconduct. The Article therefore captures an understudied problem with Big Data tools: sellers can use these tools to shield themselves from market accountability.
Finally, the Article evaluates a menu of legal strategies that would preserve the benefits of nudnik-based activism in light of these technological developments. In the process, we revisit the conventional wisdom on the desirability of form contracts, mandatory arbitration clauses, defamation law, and standing doctrines.
Keywords: consumer law, contracts, consumer protection, big data, law & technology, reputation, private ordering, consumer reviews, personalized contracts
JEL Classification: K00, K12, D11, D18, L14, L15, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation