Discrimination and Deterrence with Enforcer Liability

27 Pages Posted: 12 Dec 2019

See all articles by Murat C. Mungan

Murat C. Mungan

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 29, 2019


Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their 'success rates'. I show here that when enforcers' incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination, and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.

Keywords: racial profiling, statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination, law enforcer incentives, crime, deterrence

JEL Classification: K00, K14, K42, J14, J15

Suggested Citation

Mungan, Murat C., Discrimination and Deterrence with Enforcer Liability (October 29, 2019). Am. L. & Econ. Rev., Forthcoming, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 17-27, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3502398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3502398

Murat C. Mungan (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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