Adam Smith, the Competitive Process, and the Flawed Consumer Welfare Standard

2020, GRUR Int

11 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2020 Last revised: 1 May 2020

Date Written: December 13, 2019

Abstract

Scottish economist Adam Smith wrote in 1776 that the collective buying and selling of individuals would result in the preferred allocation of society’s resources. That insight has endured and is the basis for the competition law goal of fostering and protecting the competitive process. That goal, with venerable roots on both sides of the Atlantic, has been sidetracked by emergence of the consumer welfare standard, which is now preeminent in competition law analysis. The narrow focus of the consumer welfare standard has led to confusion and misdirected decisions that do not adequately protect the competitive process. I point to confusion about who is the buyer and who is the seller in many transactions, and describe why that classification should, in any event, be irrelevant in applying competition law. When competition is distorted, the central goal of protecting the process and ensuring a preferred allocation of resources is undermined, regardless of the impact on the consumer.

The proper welfare standard is unconcerned with where the harm occurs. The standard focuses on anticompetitive conduct at any level of the distribution chain and regardless of whether the anticompetitive effects are directed upstream at sellers or downstream at buyers. The symmetric standard is rooted in competition law decisions on both sides of the Atlantic; it is sound in theory and, compared to the consumer welfare standard, is easier to explain and apply. It more comfortably honors the broader goals of competition, including promoting entry, innovation, and choices for both entrepreneurs and consumers. I assess how this symmetric welfare standard would apply to mergers and classic predatory or exclusionary conduct. The standard offers hope of simplifying analysis and better serving ancillary goals of competition. Fostering and preserving efficiency, enhancing output, and maintaining low consumer prices are among the highly valued benefits of the competitive process, but they are not determinative. The focus must remain on the central goal of preserving the competitive process.

Keywords: antittrust, competitive process, consumer welfare standard, allocative efficiency

JEL Classification: K21, L16, L40

Suggested Citation

Grimes, Warren S., Adam Smith, the Competitive Process, and the Flawed Consumer Welfare Standard (December 13, 2019). 2020, GRUR Int, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503702 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503702

Warren S. Grimes (Contact Author)

Southwestern Law School ( email )

3050 Wilshire Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90010
United States

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