Power and Productivity: Institutions, Ideology, and Technology in Political Economy

Political Economy and Justice, (co-editors D. Allen, Y. Benkler, L. Downey, R. Henderson, J. Simons) University of Chicago Press forthcoming 2021.

25 Pages Posted: 1 Jan 2020 Last revised: 28 Jan 2021

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 14, 2019

Abstract

Market democracies struggle with economic insecurity and growing inequality, presenting new threats to democracy. The revival of “political economy” offers a frame for understanding the relationship between productivity and justice in market societies. It reintegrates power and the social and material context—institutions, ideology, and technology—into our analysis of social relations of production, or how we make and distribute what we need and want to have. Organizations and individuals, alone and in networks, struggle over how much of a society’s production happens in a market sphere, how much happens in nonmarket relations, and how embedded those aspects that do occur in markets are in social relations of mutual obligation and solidarism. These struggles at the micro, meso, and macro levels involve efforts to shape institutions, ideology, and technology in ways that trade off productivity and power, both in the short and long term, including through the production and exploitation of atavistic status-hierarchies, primarily race, gender, and immigration. The outcome of this struggle shapes the divergent paths that diverse market societies take, from oligarchic to egalitarian, and their stability as pluralistic democracies.

Keywords: political economy, technology, power

JEL Classification: P16, P48, O33, O43, K00

Suggested Citation

Benkler, Yochai, Power and Productivity: Institutions, Ideology, and Technology in Political Economy (December 14, 2019). Political Economy and Justice, (co-editors D. Allen, Y. Benkler, L. Downey, R. Henderson, J. Simons) University of Chicago Press forthcoming 2021., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3503962 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3503962

Yochai Benkler (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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