Endogenous Corporate Leverage Response to a Safer Macro Environment: the Case of Foreign Exchange Reserve Accumulation

36 Pages Posted: 16 Dec 2019 Last revised: 12 Jan 2025

See all articles by Hui Tong

Hui Tong

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Shang-Jin Wei

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: December 2019

Abstract

A country may adopt policy measures such as raising its foreign exchange reserves to better prepare for foreign interest rate shocks or sudden reversal of international capital flows, which in principle should reduce financial vulnerability for its firms and the entire economy, but the beneficial effect of such policies may be partially offset by endogenous firms’ decisions to take on more risks. We present a robust but previously undocumented relationship between corporate leverage and country-level foreign exchange reserve holdings. For 6610 non-financial firms in 23 emerging markets from 2000 to 2006, we show that more foreign reserve accumulation leads to higher corporate leverage. While the reserve accumulation can reduce macroeconomic uncertainty, the increase in corporate leverage is also significantly greater in sectors that are intrinsically more sensitive to policy uncertainty. We go from correlation to causality via a two-prong instrumental variable strategy: simultaneously (1) instrumenting FX reserves by global commodity price movement, and (2) examining leverage of firms outside the commodity-sensitive sectors.

Suggested Citation

Tong, Hui and Wei, Shang-Jin, Endogenous Corporate Leverage Response to a Safer Macro Environment: the Case of Foreign Exchange Reserve Accumulation (December 2019). NBER Working Paper No. w26545, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3504428

Hui Tong (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Shang-Jin Wei

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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