Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

56 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2019

See all articles by Francesco Decarolis

Francesco Decarolis

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Leonardo Maria Giuffrida

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata; IEFE Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Vincenzo Mollisi

University of Mannheim

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in: i) time delays, ii) cost overruns, and iii) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings.

Keywords: Buyer quality, competence, procurement, public management, state capacity

JEL Classification: D44, H11, H57

Suggested Citation

Decarolis, Francesco and Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria and Iossa, Elisabetta and Mollisi, Vincenzo and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes (2019). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 19-057, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3505848 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3505848

Francesco Decarolis (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Leonardo Maria Giuffrida

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, 00133
Italy

IEFE Bocconi University ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Vincenzo Mollisi

University of Mannheim ( email )

Universitaetsbibliothek Mannheim
Zeitschriftenabteilung
Mannheim, 68131
Germany

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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