Negotiating G2G Contracts for India’s Pulses Importing

33 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2019

See all articles by Liying Mu

Liying Mu

University of Delaware

Bin Hu

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Information Systems & Operations Management

A Amarender A. Reddy

Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI); National Institute of Agricultural Extenion Management (MANAGE)

Srinagesh Gavirneni

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Date Written: December 18, 2019

Abstract

• Problem Definition: We study operational strategies to dependably improve India’s pulses importing.

• Academic/Practical Relevance: The large low-income and/or vegetarian population in India depends heavily on pulses for affordable and/or accessible protein intake. India’s domestic pulses productivity is low, uncertain, and unlikely to change in the short term, leaving importing as the most promising area of improvement.

• Methodology: We adopt the Nash bargaining framework for our theoretical analysis, and calibrate the model with publicly available data for numerical experiments.

• Results: We show that two strategies—negotiating multiple-sourcing and non-exclusive forward contracts—can dependably improve India’s pulses importing performances.

• Managerial Implications: Our findings suggest that the Indian government should simultaneously negotiate multiple long-term contracts, and engage current major exporters, to maximize the effectiveness of its pulses importing policies.

Keywords: Nash bargaining, long-term contracts, forward contracts, Nash-in-Nash, supply chain coordination

Suggested Citation

Mu, Liying and Hu, Bin and Reddy, A Amarender A. and Gavirneni, Srinagesh, Negotiating G2G Contracts for India’s Pulses Importing (December 18, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3506235 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3506235

Liying Mu

University of Delaware ( email )

Newark, DE
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://lerner.udel.edu/faculty-staff-directory/liying-mu/

Bin Hu (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Department of Information Systems & Operations Management ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

A Amarender A. Reddy

Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) ( email )

New Delhi
India

National Institute of Agricultural Extenion Management (MANAGE) ( email )

India

Srinagesh Gavirneni

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

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