Why Do Banks Gain and Loss Sell Securities?

49 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2020 Last revised: 20 Mar 2025

See all articles by John Aland

John Aland

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Jeffrey J. Burks

University of Notre Dame

Date Written: March 20, 2025

Abstract

Accounting standards exclude most securities gains and losses from net income until the securities are sold, providing incentives to sell securities based on the gain and loss positions. We deepen understanding of this behavior in a variety of ways. First, we find that what the prior literature calls earnings “smoothing” is more precisely characterized as boosting low earnings; banks boost low earnings via gain selling but do not materially reduce high earnings via loss selling. Second, we find this behavior more in line with opportunism than with signaling, and a specific opportunistic motive is to meet the bank regulatory guideline for dividend payments. Finally, we uncover additional tendencies of banks which include selling larger portions of gain positions than loss positions, more aggressively using gain selling to offset a given amount of loss selling than vice versa, and selling securities in a pattern that conforms to prospect theory. 

Keywords: banks, securities, gain selling, loss selling smoothing, fair value, accounting JEL classification: M41, M48

JEL Classification: M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Aland, John and Burks, Jeffrey J., Why Do Banks Gain and Loss Sell Securities? (March 20, 2025). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3506414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3506414

John Aland

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )

Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Jeffrey J. Burks (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame ( email )

Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

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