Preferences for Observable Information in a Strategic Setting: An Experiment
GATE Working Paper 1936, December 2019
42 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2019
Date Written: December 19, 2019
We experimentally investigate how much value people put in observable information about others in strategic interactions. The incentivized experimental task is to predict an unknown target player's trustworthiness in an earlier hidden action game. In Experiment 1, we vary the source of information about the target player (neutral picture, neutral video, video containing strategic content). The observed prediction accuracy rates then serve as an empirical measure of the objective value of information. In Experiment 2, we elicit the subjective value of information using the standard stated preferences method ("willingness to accept"). While the elicited subjective values are ranked in the same manner as the objective ones, subjects attach value to information which does not help predict target behavior, and exaggerate the value of helpful information.
Keywords: prediction, observable information, individual characteristics, stated preferences, willingness to accept, experiment
JEL Classification: C72, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation