OTC Discount

69 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2019

See all articles by Calebe de Roure

Calebe de Roure

Reserve Bank of Australia

Emanuel Moench

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Michael Schneider

Deutsche Bundesbank; Goethe University Frankfurt

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 6, 2019

Abstract

We study price dispersion and venue choice in the interdealer market for German sovereign bonds, where an exchange and over-the-counter segments coexist. We show that 85% of OTC traded prices are favorable with respect to exchange quotes, indicating the prevalence of an OTC discount. This discount is sizeable and driven by both search and information frictions. More than 75% of volume is transacted via interdealer brokers in trades that are larger, have less price impact, and less discount than comparable bilateral OTC trades. Dealers trade on the exchange for immediacy, highlighting the complementary roles played by the different segments.

Keywords: Market Microstructure,Hybrid Markets,Venue Choice,Interdealer Brokerage,Fixed-Income,OTC Markets,Intermediation Frictions,Search Frictions,Information Frictions

JEL Classification: D4,D47,G1,G14,G24

Suggested Citation

de Roure, Calebe and Moench, Emanuel and Pelizzon, Loriana and Schneider, Michael, OTC Discount (November 6, 2019). Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 42/2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3507679 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3507679

Calebe De Roure (Contact Author)

Reserve Bank of Australia ( email )

65, Martin Place
Sydney, NSW 2000
Australia

Emanuel Moench

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.safe-frankfurt.de

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Michael Schneider

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431
Germany

Goethe University Frankfurt

Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

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