Defective Patent Deference

77 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2020 Last revised: 1 Jun 2020

See all articles by Tejas N. Narechania

Tejas N. Narechania

University of California, Berkeley, School of Law

Date Written: May 31, 2020

Abstract

The Supreme Court’s implicit deference to the Office of the Solicitor General in patent cases is well documented: What the Solicitor General requests, the Solicitor General typically receives. But we know far less about how the Solicitor General arrives at these preferred policy positions, or why the Solicitor General comes to advocate for some outcomes over others. This is problematic. In practically every other corner of the administrative state, an agency earns substantial deference to its views only where robust procedural protections attend to the policymaking process, where the agency’s outcome reflects its substantive expertise, and where the agency may, through presidential removal and election, be held politically accountable for its policy choices.

Not so in patent law. The Patent Office has never claimed to exercise any substantive rulemaking power. Meanwhile, the Solicitor General develops and advocates for patent policy outcomes, but behind closed doors, without deep internal expertise, and under the time constraints of appellate litigation. These shortcomings (among others) suggest that we should re-examine the Solicitor General’s influence over patent policy in favor of alternate interpretive practices that improve Executive Branch decisionmaking. And they counsel in favor of several reforms — most importantly, to the policymaking power of the Patent Office.

Keywords: deference, patent, Patent Office, PTO, solicitor general, Chevron, Kisor, Auer, Skidmore, Supreme Court, Cuozzo, KSR, Myriad, Merck, patent law, administrative law

Suggested Citation

Narechania, Tejas N., Defective Patent Deference (May 31, 2020). 95 Washington Law Review 869 (2020), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3508880

Tejas N. Narechania (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley, School of Law ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.tejasnarechania.net

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
63
Abstract Views
614
rank
495,561
PlumX Metrics