Information Management in Times of Crisis

45 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2019 Last revised: 2 Mar 2021

See all articles by Haelim Anderson

Haelim Anderson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Adam M. Copeland

Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1, 2019

Abstract

How does information management and control affect bank stability? Following a national bank holiday in 1933, New York state bank regulators suspended the publication of balance sheets of state-charter banks for two years, whereas the national-charter bank regulator did not. We use this divergence in policies to examine how the suspension of bank-specific information affected depositors. We find that state-charter banks experienced significantly less deposit outflows than national-charter banks in 1933. However, the behavior of bank deposits across both types of banks converged in 1934 after the introduction of federal deposit insurance.

Keywords: information management, bank opacity, banking crisis, Great Depression, depositor confidence

JEL Classification: G21, G28, N22

Suggested Citation

Anderson, Haelim and Copeland, Adam M., Information Management in Times of Crisis (December 1, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3509853 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3509853

Haelim Anderson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ( email )

550 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20429
United States

Adam M. Copeland (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )

33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States

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