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A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games

GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004

21 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2003 Last revised: 1 May 2012

Marco A. Marini

University of Rome La Sapienza; CREI, University Rome III

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Date Written: December 9, 2002

Abstract

This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.

Keywords: Cooperative Equilibrium, Coalitions

JEL Classification: C7

Suggested Citation

Marini, Marco A. and Currarini, Sergio, A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games (December 9, 2002). GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=351040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.351040

Marco A. Marini (Contact Author)

University of Rome La Sapienza ( email )

Piazzale Aldo Moro, 5
Rome, 00181
Italy
+39 06 49910843 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/marini/

CREI, University Rome III ( email )

Via Ostiense, 161
Rome, 00154
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://host.uniroma3.it/centri/crei/

Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

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