A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games
GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004
21 Pages Posted: 21 Feb 2003 Last revised: 1 May 2012
Date Written: December 9, 2002
This paper presents a new cooperative equilibrium for strategic form games, denoted Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium (CCE). This concept is based on the expectation that joint deviations from any strategy profile are followed by an optimal and noncooperative reaction of non deviators. We show that CCE exist for all symmetric supermodular games. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of a CCE in specific submodular games employed in the literature on environmental agreements.
Keywords: Cooperative Equilibrium, Coalitions
JEL Classification: C7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation