Consumer Inertia and Competition-Sensitive Data Governance: The Case of Open Banking

13 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2020

See all articles by Oscar Borgogno

Oscar Borgogno

University of Turin, Faculty of Law; University of Oxford, Saïd Business School, Faculty of Law

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics; Stanford Law School; Bocconi University - Department of Law; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management

Date Written: January 3, 2020

Abstract

The issue of consumer disengagement has troubled regulators and policy makers for years, since it undermines the functioning of sound competitive markets by allowing incumbents to enjoy economic supracompetive returns to the detriment of innovation and consumer welfare. The market investigation into the banking industry launched by the UK Competition and Market Authority (CMA) represents an original attempt to tackle the problem through antitrust enforcement. By building on the access-to-account rule enshrined within the European regulatory framework of the revised Payment Service Directive and the most recent developments of FinTech innovation, the CMA has designed a set of measures aimed at addressing some of the structural features causing adverse effects on competition in the retail markets, ultimately paving the way towards Open Banking. The paper highlights the rationales, benefits and potential drawbacks of the UK Open Banking plan, investigating if this regulatory intervention can act as a blueprint for harnessing the competitive potential of data-driven innovation of the financial industry and the digital economy as a whole.

Keywords: consumer engagement, Open Banking, FinTech, big data, access-to-account rule

JEL Classification: G28, K21, L50

Suggested Citation

Borgogno, Oscar and Colangelo, Giuseppe, Consumer Inertia and Competition-Sensitive Data Governance: The Case of Open Banking (January 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3513514 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3513514

Oscar Borgogno

University of Turin, Faculty of Law ( email )

Torino
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.dg.unito.it/do/docenti.pl/Show?_id=oborgogn#profilo

University of Oxford, Saïd Business School, Faculty of Law

St Cross Building
St Cross Rd
Oxford
United Kingdom

Giuseppe Colangelo (Contact Author)

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

Bocconi University - Department of Law ( email )

Via Roentgen, 1
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
126
Abstract Views
491
rank
240,507
PlumX Metrics