Unifying Commercial Laws of Nation States Coordination of Legal Systems and Economic Growth

METEOR RM/02/029

Posted: 9 Apr 2011 Last revised: 26 Jan 2024

See all articles by P. Jean-Jacques Herings

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Tilburg University

Arnald J. Kanning

Maastricht University - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 7, 2011

Abstract

This paper analyzes unifications of nationally defined commercial laws within an elementary non-cooperative game-theoretical framework. In the absence of any coordination, it is far from obvious that nation-states will ever succeed in selecting the very same commercial laws. Yet, as the gains to be reaped by adherence to the same commercial laws may not necessarily be distributed equally among the nation-states involved, coordination may be quite difficult to achieve. In this respect, a nation-state that is better able to spur economic growth than all other nation-states will be able to influence the outcome of any coordination of decisions between nation-states in a profound way. This is because nation-states may voluntarily seek to adopt the legal rules of a nation-state that is strongest able to boost economic growth into a uniform commercial law. Thereby, nation-states may most stimulate their exports to and capital investments from the nation-state that is the strongest engine of economic growth.

JEL Classification: C52, K00

Suggested Citation

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques and Kanning, Arnald J., Unifying Commercial Laws of Nation States Coordination of Legal Systems and Economic Growth (April 7, 2011). METEOR RM/02/029, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=351620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.351620

P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

Department of Econometrics and Operations Research
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4668797 (Phone)
5000 LE (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/jean-jacques-herings/home

Arnald J. Kanning

Maastricht University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

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