Advocacy versus Enforcement in Antitrust Compliance Programs

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Forthcoming

University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 20-7

26 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2020 Last revised: 6 Mar 2020

See all articles by Hung-Hao Chang

Hung-Hao Chang

National Taiwan University

D. Daniel Sokol

USC Gould School of Law; USC Marshall School of Business

Date Written: January 10, 2020

Abstract

We focus on the question of why firms self-regulate to avoid more severe public regulation in the area of antitrust compliance. We distinguish the effects of an antitrust authority’s outreach and enforcement on firms' adoption of antitrust compliance programs. Furthermore, we examine the mechanism that may drive an antitrust authority’s actions on firms' decisions to adopt compliance programs. Using a two-year survey of 432 firms drawn from the top three hundred Taiwanese enterprises and applying mediation analysis, we find that “voluntary” self-regulation actions, encouraged by the antitrust authority to promote compliance programs via advocacy, significantly increase the creation of antitrust compliance programs. Moreover, “coercive” actions of the antitrust authority in terms of enforcement are less effective than voluntary actions for firms’ compliance programs creation. Within “coercive” actions, large fines are more likely to lead to the adoption of antitrust compliance programs relative to other forms of government prosecution.

Keywords: antitrust, compliance programs, competition authority, mediation model, advocacy, Taiwan

JEL Classification: K21, K22, L40, M10

Suggested Citation

Chang, Howard and Sokol, D. Daniel, Advocacy versus Enforcement in Antitrust Compliance Programs (January 10, 2020). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Forthcoming, University of Florida Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 20-7, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3517004

Howard Chang

National Taiwan University ( email )

No 1 Roosevelt road
Taipei, 10617
Taiwan

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

USC Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

USC Marshall School of Business ( email )

701 Exposition Blvd
Los Angeles, CA California 90089
United States

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