A Characterization of Approval Voting Without the Approval Balloting Assumption

17 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2020

See all articles by Federica Ceron

Federica Ceron

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Stéphane Gonzalez

University of Saint Etienne

Date Written: December 19, 2019

Abstract

We provide an axiomatic characterization of Approval Voting without the approval balloting assumption. The dichotomous structure of the informational basis of Approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of normative conditions on the voting procedure. The first one is the well-known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, ballot richness, requires voters to be able to express a sufficiently rich set of opinions; the last one, dubbed no single-voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the outcome of the election. Such result is promising insofar it suggests that the informational basis of voting may have a normative relevance that deserves formal treatment.

Keywords: Informational basis, balloting procedure, Approval voting, Evaluative voting

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Ceron, Federica and Gonzalez, Stéphane, A Characterization of Approval Voting Without the Approval Balloting Assumption (December 19, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519847 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3519847

Federica Ceron (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Stéphane Gonzalez

University of Saint Etienne ( email )

6, rue basse des rives
Saint Etienne, 42023
France

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