Forward Guidance and Corporate Lending

Abstract

We suggest that forward guidance, via publicly committing the central bank to future actions and creating associated expectations, fundamentally affects bank-lending decisions independently of other forms of monetary policy. To test this hypothesis, we build a forward guidance measure based on the language used in the Federal Open Market Committee meetings and match this measure with syndicated loans. Our results show that expansionary forward guidance decreases corporate loan spreads and that this effect is stronger for well-capitalized banks lending to riskier firms. Forward guidance also affects nonprice lending terms, such as covenants, performance pricing provisions, and the loan syndicate structure, whereas banks more easily initiate new lending relationships with lower spreads.

Keywords: Forward guidance; Monetary policy transmission; Bank lending; Corporate loans; Loan spreads; Syndicate structure; Bank-firm relationships

JEL Classification: G21; E52; E43; E58