Governance and State-Owned Enterprises: How Costly is Corruption?

44 Pages Posted: 22 Jan 2020

See all articles by Anja Baum

Anja Baum

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Clay Hackney

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Paulo A. Medas

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Mouhamadou Sy

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: November 2019

Abstract

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are present in key sectors of the economies around the world. While they can provide an important public service, there is widespread concern that their activities are negatively affected by corruption. However, there is limited cross-country analysis on the costs of corruption for SOEs. We present new evidence on how corruption affects the performance of SOEs using firm level data across a large number of countries. One striking result is that SOEs perform as well as private firms in core sectors when corruption is low. Taking advantage of a novel database reforms, we also show that SOE governance reforms can generate significant performance gains.

Keywords: Economic policy, Economic growth, Financial indicators, Economic indicators, Public sector, State-owned enterprises, firm performance, corruption, governance reforms, WP, SOEs, IMF program, conditionality, governance reform, control of corruption

JEL Classification: D20, D73, H00, E01, C43, E2, O4, Z13

Suggested Citation

Baum, Anja and Hackney, Clay and Medas, Paulo A. and Sy, Mouhamadou, Governance and State-Owned Enterprises: How Costly is Corruption? (November 2019). IMF Working Paper No. 19/253, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523126

Anja Baum (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Clay Hackney

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Paulo A. Medas

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Mouhamadou Sy

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

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