Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions

67 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2020

See all articles by Kenju Kamei

Kenju Kamei

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: January 3, 2020

Abstract

This paper experimentally studies individuals’ voluntary disclosure of past behaviors and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under certain conditions, although a non-negligible fraction of individuals do not disclose information about the past and proceed to behave opportunistically. On closer inspection, the data revealed that the material incentives of disclosure acts differ according to the matching protocol. Specifically, disclosers receive higher payoffs than non-disclosers if the disclosers are assured to be matched with like-minded disclosers; conversely, disclosers are vulnerable to exploitation by others under random matching. These results suggest that mandatory disclosure helps enhance economic efficiency if individuals’ hiding and uncooperative behaviors are liable to precipitate a collapse in the community norms.

Keywords: experiment, information disclosure, cooperation, dilemma, repeated games, reputation

JEL Classification: C92, D74, D83

Suggested Citation

Kamei, Kenju, Voluntary Disclosure of Information and Cooperation in Simultaneous-Move Economic Interactions (January 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3523349

Kenju Kamei (Contact Author)

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Durham, DH1 3HY
United Kingdom

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