Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon

42 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2020

See all articles by Michalis Drouvelis

Michalis Drouvelis

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Bilal Malaeb

Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI)

Jackline Wahba

University of Southampton, Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Michael Vlassopoulos

University of Southampton

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2019

Abstract

Lebanon is the country with the highest density of refugees in the world, raising the question of whether the host and refugee populations can cooperate harmoniously. We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Lebanon studying intra- and inter-group behavior of Syrian refugees and Lebanese nationals in a repeated public good game without and with punishment. We find that homogeneous groups, on average, contribute and punish significantly more than mixed groups. These patterns are driven by the Lebanese participants. Our findings suggest that it is equally important to provide adequate help to the host communities to alleviate any economic and social pressures.

Keywords: refugees, public good game, cooperation, punishment

JEL Classification: D910, J500, F220

Suggested Citation

Drouvelis, Michalis and Malaeb, Bilal and Wahba, Jackline and Vlassopoulos, Michael, Cooperation in a Fragmented Society: Experimental Evidence on Syrian Refugees and Natives in Lebanon (2019). CESifo Working Paper No. 8038, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523542

Michalis Drouvelis

University of Birmingham - Department of Economics ( email )

Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/michalisdrouvelis/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Bilal Malaeb

Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI) ( email )

Queen Elizabeth House (QEH)
3 Mansfield Road
Oxford, OX1 3TB
United Kingdom

Jackline Wahba

University of Southampton, Department of Economics ( email )

Southampton, SO171BJ
United Kingdom
+44 23 8059 3996 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/jackiewahba/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Michael Vlassopoulos (Contact Author)

University of Southampton ( email )

University Rd.
Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hampshire SO17 1LP
United Kingdom

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