Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees

46 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2020

See all articles by Boris Ginzburg

Boris Ginzburg

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

José-Alberto Guerra

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Warn N. Lekfuangfu

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; CEP, London School of Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 30, 2019

Abstract

How do voting institutions affect incentives of committees to vote expressively? We model the problem of a committee, whose members have different depths of reasoning, that decides whether to approve an ethical proposal. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, but all members pay a cost if the proposal is passed. The model suggests that institutional features that reduce the probability of a member being pivotal – such as larger committee size, or a more restrictive majority rule – increase the expected share of votes in favour of the ethical alternative. A laboratory experiment with a charitable donation framing demonstrates comparative statics that are in line with these results. Furthermore, we structurally estimate the distribution of expressive preferences across individuals. We also find that a high proportion of subjects are strategically naive.

Keywords: expressive voting, committees, pivotality, laboratory experiment

Suggested Citation

Ginzburg, Boris and Guerra, José Alberto and Lekfuangfu, Warn N., Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees (November 30, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3524295 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3524295

Boris Ginzburg (Contact Author)

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

José Alberto Guerra

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia

HOME PAGE: http://jguerraforero.wixsite.com/joseaguerra

Warn N. Lekfuangfu

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CEP, London School of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/warnlekfuangfu/

University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

Drayton House
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

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