The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance: Key Legal Design Issues

72 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2020

See all articles by Wouter Bossu

Wouter Bossu

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Arthur Rossi

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Date Written: December 2019

Abstract

This paper discusses key legal issues in the design of Board Oversight in central banks. Central banks are complex and sophisticated organizations that are challenging to manage. While most economic literature focuses on decision-making in the context of monetary policy formulation, this paper focuses on the Board oversight of central banks-a central feature of sound governance. This form of oversight is the decision-making responsibility through which an internal body of the central bank-the Oversight Board-ensures that the central bank is well-managed. First, the paper will contextualize the role of Board oversight into the broader legal structure for central bank governance by considering this form of oversight as one of the core decision-making responsibilities of central banks. Secondly, the paper will focus on a number of important legal design issues for Board Oversight, by contrasting the current practices of the IMF membership's 174 central banks with staff's advisory practice developed over the past 50 years.

Keywords: Central bank capital, Reserve requirements, Central bank legislation, Central banks, Central bank governance, Board Oversight, Legal Design, WP, oversight board, bank law, executive management, policy formulation, non-executive

JEL Classification: E5, E58, G21, E52, K2, E01

Suggested Citation

Bossu, Wouter and Rossi, Arthur, The Role of Board Oversight in Central Bank Governance: Key Legal Design Issues (December 2019). IMF Working Paper No. 19/293. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3524313

Wouter Bossu (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Arthur Rossi

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
12
Abstract Views
73
PlumX Metrics