Economists’ Tunney Act Reply Comments on the DOJ’s Proposed Remedy in the Sprint/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding

468 Pages Posted: 26 Jan 2020

See all articles by Nicholas Economides

Nicholas Economides

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

John E. Kwoka, Jr.

Northeastern University - Department of Economics

Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert Seamans

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

Hal J. Singer

Econ One

Marshall Steinbaum

University of Utah Department of Economics

Lawrence J. White

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

Following up on our initial comments at the Tunney Act proceeding of the proposed merger between Sprint and T-Mobile, we discuss DOJ’s criticisms of these comments, explaining why these criticisms are baseless. Moreover, using evidence from the NY v. Deutsche Telecom trial, we provide new arguments showing that the DOJ proposed remedy will fail to restore the ex ante competitive conditions in the affected antitrust product markets to the detriment of users of mobile phones in the United States.

Keywords: Telecommunications, Merger, Tunney Act, Sprint, T-Mobile, Dish, DOJ, AT&T, Verizon

JEL Classification: L1, L4, L5, L9

Suggested Citation

Economides, Nicholas and Kwoka, John E. and Philippon, Thomas and Seamans, Robert and Singer, Hal J. and Steinbaum, Marshall and White, Lawrence J., Economists’ Tunney Act Reply Comments on the DOJ’s Proposed Remedy in the Sprint/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding (2020). NET Institute Working Paper No. 20-02, 2020, NYU Stern School of Business, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525258 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3525258

Nicholas Economides (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

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John E. Kwoka

Northeastern University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Boston, MA 02115
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(617) 373-3640 (Fax)

Thomas Philippon

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
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New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
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Robert Seamans

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

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Hal J. Singer

Econ One ( email )

805 15th Street
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202.312.3065 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.econone.com/staff-member/hal-singer/

Marshall Steinbaum

University of Utah Department of Economics ( email )

1645 Central Campus Dr.
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://faculty.utah.edu/u6024209-Marshall_Steinbaum/hm/index.hml

Lawrence J. White

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

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