Demand for Safety, Risky Loans: A Model of Securitization

66 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2020

Date Written: January 2020

Abstract

We build a competitive equilibrium model of securitization in the presence of demand for safety by some investors. Securitization allows to create safe assets by pooling idiosyncratic risks from loan originators, leading to higher aggregate loan issuance. Yet, the distribution of loan risks out of their originators creates a moral hazard problem. An increase in the demand for safety leads to a securitization boom and riskier originated loans. When demand for safety is high, welfare is Pareto higher than in an economy with no securitization despite the origination of riskier loans. Aggregate lending expansions driven by demand for safety may, paradoxically, lead to riskier loan issuance than expansions driven by standard credit supply shocks.

Keywords: Diversification, moral hazard, Originate-to-distribute, Safety demand, Securitization

JEL Classification: G01, G20, G28

Suggested Citation

Segura Velez, Anatoli and Villacorta, Luis Alonso, Demand for Safety, Risky Loans: A Model of Securitization (January 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14313. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526037

Anatoli Segura Velez (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

Luis Alonso Villacorta

UC Santa Cruz ( email )

Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States

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