Big Tech Mergers

41 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2020 Last revised: 10 Feb 2020

See all articles by Massimo Motta

Massimo Motta

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Martin Peitz

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 2020

Abstract

Big tech mergers are frequently occurring events. What are the competitive effects of these mergers? With the help of a simple model we identify the acquisition of potential competitors as a pressing issue for merger control in digital industries. We also sketch a few novel theories of harm of horizontal and conglomerate mergers that are potentially relevant in digital industries. Finally, we draw some policy recommendations on how to deal with mergers in such industries.

Keywords: Acquisitions, Antitrust, competition policy, Digital Markets, platforms

Suggested Citation

Motta, Massimo and Peitz, Martin, Big Tech Mergers (January 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14353, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526079

Massimo Motta (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain

Martin Peitz

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
+49 621 181-1835 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://peitz.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/

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