Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions
32 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2020
Date Written: January 27, 2020
Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each student received a smaller set of schools that he can get in using a strategy, weakening incentives to manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools more available for non-strategic students. We also show that the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and S¨onmez (2013) is incomplete.
Keywords: matching market design, school choice, college admission, manipulability
JEL Classification: C78, D47, D78, D82
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation