Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions

32 Pages Posted: 28 Jan 2020

See all articles by Somouaoga Bonkoungou

Somouaoga Bonkoungou

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Alexander Nesterov

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: January 27, 2020

Abstract

Recently dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admission rules. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new rules were strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that after the reforms the rules became more immune to strategic admissions: each student received a smaller set of schools that he can get in using a strategy, weakening incentives to manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools more available for non-strategic students. We also show that the existing explanation of the puzzle due to Pathak and S¨onmez (2013) is incomplete.

Keywords: matching market design, school choice, college admission, manipulability

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D78, D82

Suggested Citation

Bonkoungou, Somouaoga and Nesterov, Alexander, Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions (January 27, 2020). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 222/EC/2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526194 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3526194

Somouaoga Bonkoungou

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Soyza Pechatnikov str., 15
St. Petersburg, 190068
Russia

Alexander Nesterov (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Soyza Pechatnikov str., 15
St. Petersburg, 190068
Russia

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
29
Abstract Views
253
PlumX Metrics