Justice is in the Eyes of the Beholder – Eye Tracking Evidence on Balancing Normative Concerns in Torts Cases

58 Pages Posted: 29 Jan 2020

See all articles by Christoph Engel

Christoph Engel

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students; Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Rima-Maria Rahal

Tilburg University

Date Written: January 28, 2020

Abstract

Frequently deciding legal cases requires an assessment in multiple, conceptually incompatible dimensions. Often one normative concern would call for one decision, and another normative concern for a different decision. The decision-maker must engage in balancing, with no help from overarching normative theory. A typical situation is torts. The decision must regularly balance concerns on behalf of the victim, the tort feasor and society at large, both on utilitarian and deontological grounds.

In this paper we use eye tracking to investigate in which ways laypersons' thought processes react to normative conflict in a set of 16 torts vignettes. If normative conflict is present, participants are less likely to agree with the likely outcome if the case were tried in a German court; they take longer to decide, and they fixate longer on normative concerns presented on a decision screen. Eye movements show that participants indeed consider multiple normative concerns in competition.

Keywords: torts, fundamental normative relativity, compensation, deterrence, utilitarian and deontological concerns, balancing, eye tracking, machine learning

JEL Classification: D01, D81, D91, K13, K40

Suggested Citation

Engel, Christoph and Rahal, Rima-Maria, Justice is in the Eyes of the Beholder – Eye Tracking Evidence on Balancing Normative Concerns in Torts Cases (January 28, 2020). MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper, 2020/3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3526696 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3526696

Christoph Engel (Contact Author)

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

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University of Bonn - Faculty of Law & Economics

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Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), Erasmus School of Law, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, Students ( email )

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Rotterdam
Netherlands

Universität Osnabrück - Faculty of Law

Osnabruck, D-49069
Germany

Rima-Maria Rahal

Tilburg University ( email )

Prof. Cobbenhagenlaan 225
Tilburg, Noord-Brabant 5037DB
Netherlands

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