The Evolution of EU Antitrust Policy: 1966–2017

(2020) 83 Modern Law Review 321

52 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2020

See all articles by Pablo Ibáñez Colomo

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo

London School of Economics - Law School

Andriani Kalintiri

King’s College London

Date Written: January 29, 2020

Abstract

This article describes, and puts in context, the evolution of the enforcement practice of the European Commission in the area of EU antitrust law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). It considers all formal decisions adopted in the period between 1966 – when the European Court of Justice delivered the two seminal rulings that marked the discipline – and the end of 2017. The article classifies Commission decisions in accordance with four enforcement paradigms. The descriptive statistics show that the cases that the Commission chooses to prioritise have changed over the years. First, enforcement has progressively moved towards the core and the outer boundaries of the system. Second, it has become policy-driven rather than law-driven. Third, the nature of the cases chosen by the Commission is consistent with its commitment to a ‘more economics-based approach’ to enforcement. Finally, these cases signal a move towards a more ambitious stage in the process of the integration of Member States’ economies.

Keywords: EU competition policy; public enforcement; Article 101 TFEU; Article 102 TFEU; Regulation 17; Regulation 1/2003; modernisation

JEL Classification: K21, L14, L24, L41, L42

Suggested Citation

Ibáñez Colomo, Pablo and Kalintiri, Andriani, The Evolution of EU Antitrust Policy: 1966–2017 (January 29, 2020). (2020) 83 Modern Law Review 321, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3527419

Pablo Ibáñez Colomo (Contact Author)

London School of Economics - Law School ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Andriani Kalintiri

King’s College London ( email )

Strand
London, England WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

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