Antitrust and Restrictions on Privacy in the Digital Economy

9 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2020 Last revised: 9 Sep 2020

See all articles by Nicholas Economides

Nicholas Economides

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

Ioannis Lianos

University College London - Faculty of Laws; BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre - HSE National Research University

Date Written: January 24, 2020

Abstract

We present a model of a market failure based on a requirement provision by digital platforms in the acquisition of personal information from users of other products/services. We establish the economic harm from the market failure and the requirement using traditional antitrust methodology. Eliminating the requirement and the market failure by creating a functioning market for the sale of personal information would create a functioning market for personal information that would benefit users. Even though market harm is established under the assumption that consumers are perfectly informed about the value of their privacy, we show that when users are not well informed, there can be additional harms to this market failure.

Keywords: personal information; Internet search; Google; Facebook; digital; privacy; restrictions of competition; exploitation; market failure; hold up; merger; abuse of a dominant position; unfair commercial practices; excessive data extraction; self-determination; behavioral manipulation; remedies

JEL Classification: K21, L1, L12, L4, L41, L5, L86, L88

Suggested Citation

Economides, Nicholas and Lianos, Ioannis, Antitrust and Restrictions on Privacy in the Digital Economy (January 24, 2020). Concurrences Review No. 2-2020, pp. 22-30, May 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3527818 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3527818

Nicholas Economides (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0864 (Phone)
212-995-4218 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/

Ioannis Lianos

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

London
United Kingdom

BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre - HSE National Research University ( email )

28/11, Shabolovka ulitsa
Moscow, 109028
Russia

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