Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines

60 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2020

See all articles by Benjamin Crost

Benjamin Crost

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Joseph H. Felter

Stanford University

Hani Mansour

University of Colorado at Denver - Department of Economics

Daniel I. Rees

University of Colorado Denver; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: January 29, 2020

Abstract

Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbent's political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.

Suggested Citation

Crost, Benjamin and Felter, Joseph H. and Mansour, Hani and Rees, Daniel I., Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines (January 29, 2020). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 9126, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3527829

Benjamin Crost (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ( email )

1301 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, IL 61801
United States

Joseph H. Felter

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Hani Mansour

University of Colorado at Denver - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 181
P.O. Box 173364
Denver, CO 80218
United States

Daniel I. Rees

University of Colorado Denver ( email )

Campus Box 181
P.O. Box 173364
Denver, CO 80218
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
14
Abstract Views
164
PlumX Metrics