Regulatory Forbearance in the U.S. Insurance Industry: The Effects of Removing Capital Requirements for an Asset Class

Abstract

We analyze the effects of a reform of capital regulation for U.S. insurance companies in 2009. Its design eliminates capital buffers against unexpected losses associated with portfolio holdings of MBS, but not for other fixed-income assets. After the reform, insurance companies are much more likely to retain downgraded MBS compared to other downgraded assets. This pattern is more pronounced for financially constrained insurers. Exploiting discontinuities in the reform's implementation, we can identify the relevance of the capital-requirements channel. We also document that the insurance industry crowds outs other investors in the new issuance of (high-yield) MBS.

Keywords: insurance industry, capital regulation, regulatory reform, NAIC, risk-based capital requirements

JEL Classification: G20, G22, G23, G28