Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-reduction Investigations

Qi (George) Chen, Damian R. Beil, Izak Duenyas (2022) Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations. Operations Research 70(6):3054-3075.

57 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2020 Last revised: 12 Sep 2023

See all articles by Qi (George) Chen

Qi (George) Chen

London Business School

Damian R. Beil

Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Izak Duenyas

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: September 10, 2022

Abstract

A buyer seeking to outsource production may be able to find ways to reduce a potential supplier's cost, e.g., by suggesting improvements to the supplier's proposed production methods. We study how a buyer could use such "cost-reduction investigations" by proposing a three-step supplier selection mechanism: First, each of several potential suppliers submits a price bid for a contract. Second, for each potential supplier, the buyer can exert an effort to see if she can identify how the supplier could reduce his cost to perform the contract; the understanding is that if savings are found, they are passed on to the buyer if the supplier is awarded the contract. Third, the buyer awards the contract to whichever supplier has the lowest updated bid (the supplier's initial bid price minus any cost-reduction the buyer was able to identify for that supplier). For this proposed process, we characterize how the buyer's decision on which suppliers to investigate cost reductions for in step 2 is affected by the aggressiveness of the suppliers' bids in step 1. We show that even if the buyer does not share the cost savings she identifies in step 2, ex ante symmetric suppliers are actually better off (ex ante) in our proposed mechanism than in a setting without such cost-reduction investigations, resulting in a win-win for the buyer and suppliers. When suppliers' cost and cost-reduction distributions become very heterogeneous, the win-win situation may no longer hold, but every supplier still has an incentive to allow the buyer to investigate him in step 2 because it increases his chance of winning the contract. Using an optimal mechanism analysis, our numerical studies show that our proposed Bid-Investigate-Award mechanism helps the buyer achieve near-optimal performance, despite its simplicity.

Keywords: Procurement, Cost-Reduction Investigation, Win-Win, Mechanism Design, First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction, Optimal Mechanism

JEL Classification: C61, C73, D44

Suggested Citation

Chen, Qi (George) and Beil, Damian R. and Duenyas, Izak, Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-reduction Investigations (September 10, 2022). Qi (George) Chen, Damian R. Beil, Izak Duenyas (2022) Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations. Operations Research 70(6):3054-3075., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3529997

Qi (George) Chen (Contact Author)

London Business School ( email )

Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7000 8848 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 7000 7001 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.georgeqc.com

Damian R. Beil

Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/damianbeil/

Izak Duenyas

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

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