Disagreement Under Almost Common Knowledge of Rationality

14 Pages Posted: 4 Mar 2020

See all articles by Emiliano Catonini

Emiliano Catonini

National Research University Higher School of Economics - International College of Economics and Finance

Tatiana Mayskaya

National Research University Higher School of Economics - International College of Economics and Finance; National Research University Higher School of Economics - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: February 2, 2020

Abstract

Two agents sincerely exchange their best guesses about the state of the world infinitely many times. When each agent places a small positive probability on the event that her opponent is of some finite level of reasoning and initial disagreement is large enough (that is, private signals are strong and different), permanent and large disagreement is possible even for infinitely sophisticated agents.

Keywords: disagreement, almost common knowledge, level-k reasoning

JEL Classification: D83

Suggested Citation

Catonini, Emiliano and Mayskaya, Tatiana, Disagreement Under Almost Common Knowledge of Rationality (February 2, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530563 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530563

Emiliano Catonini

National Research University Higher School of Economics - International College of Economics and Finance ( email )

ul. Shabolovka, 26
office 3431
Moscow, 119049
Russia

Tatiana Mayskaya (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics - International College of Economics and Finance ( email )

Pokrovski Bulvar 11, Korpus Zh, Office 715
Moscow, 109028
Russia

National Research University Higher School of Economics - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Shabolovka 26
Moscow, 119049
Russia

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