Game Theory for International Accords
25 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2020
Date Written: February 6, 2020
Abstract
Realpolitik is the claim that agreements in international relations are worthless since there is no institution to enforce them. Game theoretician Robert J. Aumann suggests in his Nobel lecture (2006) that “The fundamental insight is that repetition is like an enforcement mechanism” . The application of this insight to international relations allows for the improvement of their applicability and thus it refutes Realpolitik.
Early game theory appeared as an alternative to the social sciences; it is better anchored within the social science — as a useful tool. This renders game-theoretical recommendations irenic. Aumann (1990) argues that there is no a priori reason to expect that agreement to cooperate should have practical results. His claim rests on an additional assumption: at times no improvement is observed. Yet at times significant improvement is observed. This should encourage the search for the conditions that lead to improvement; it goes well with the proposal to consider game theory part-and-parcel of social science: how does playing in a given game depend the culture within which it takes place.
Keywords: Realpolitik, Game Theory, International Relations, Peace and War, International Law, Prisoner's Dilemma
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation