Game Theory for International Accords

25 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2020

See all articles by Uri Weiss

Uri Weiss

Polonsky Academy, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute

Joseph Agassi

Tel Aviv University

Date Written: February 6, 2020

Abstract

Realpolitik is the claim that agreements in international relations are worthless since there is no institution to enforce them. Game theoretician Robert J. Aumann suggests in his Nobel lecture (2006) that “The fundamental insight is that repetition is like an enforcement mechanism” . The application of this insight to international relations allows for the improvement of their applicability and thus it refutes Realpolitik.

Early game theory appeared as an alternative to the social sciences; it is better anchored within the social science — as a useful tool. This renders game-theoretical recommendations irenic. Aumann (1990) argues that there is no a priori reason to expect that agreement to cooperate should have practical results. His claim rests on an additional assumption: at times no improvement is observed. Yet at times significant improvement is observed. This should encourage the search for the conditions that lead to improvement; it goes well with the proposal to consider game theory part-and-parcel of social science: how does playing in a given game depend the culture within which it takes place.

Keywords: Realpolitik, Game Theory, International Relations, Peace and War, International Law, Prisoner's Dilemma

Suggested Citation

Weiss, Uri and Agassi, Joseph, Game Theory for International Accords (February 6, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533335 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533335

Uri Weiss (Contact Author)

Polonsky Academy, Van Leer Jerusalem Institute ( email )

Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel

Joseph Agassi

Tel Aviv University ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel-Aviv, 6997801
Israel

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