What Determines Where Opportunity Knocks? Political Affiliation in the Selection of Opportunity Zones

40 Pages Posted: 5 Mar 2020

See all articles by Mary Margaret Frank

Mary Margaret Frank

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business

Jeffrey L. Hoopes

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area

Rebecca Lester

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: January 7, 2020

Abstract

We examine the role of political affiliation during the selection of Opportunity Zones, a place-based tax incentive enacted by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. We find governors are on average 7.6% more likely to select a census tract as an Opportunity Zone when the tract’s state representative is a member of the governor’s political party. Further, we find that this effect ranges from 0.0% to 26.4% based on the state-level processes governors used to select Opportunity Zones, such as engagement of professional advisors and implementation of public comment procedures. These effects are incremental to important demographic factors that also increased the likelihood of selection, such as lower income levels and improving local conditions. These results provide evidence relevant for current Congressional legislative proposals by informing the extent to which state-level politics and processes affected the implementation of this incentive.

Keywords: Place-based tax incentives, Opportunity Zones, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

JEL Classification: H24, H25, H21, O18, O21, R38

Suggested Citation

Frank, Mary Margaret and Hoopes, Jeffrey L. and Lester, Rebecca, What Determines Where Opportunity Knocks? Political Affiliation in the Selection of Opportunity Zones (January 7, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3534451 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3534451

Mary Margaret Frank

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
434-924-4432 (Phone)
434-243-5021 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.darden.virginia.edu/faculty/frank.htm

Jeffrey L. Hoopes

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

Rebecca Lester (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/rebecca-lester

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