The Link between Public and Private Insurance and Hiv-Related Mortality

27 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2002 Last revised: 30 Oct 2010

See all articles by Jay Bhattacharya

Jay Bhattacharya

Stanford University - Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Dana P. Goldman

RAND Corporation; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Neeraj Sood

University of Southern California; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); RAND Corporation; University of Southern California - Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics

Date Written: November 2002

Abstract

As policymakers consider expanding insurance coverage for HIV+ individuals, it is useful to ask if insurance has any affect on health outcomes; and, if so, whether public insurance is as efficacious as private insurance in preventing premature deaths among HIV+ patients. Using data from a nationally representative cohort of HIV-infected persons receiving regular medical care, we estimate the impact of different types of insurance on mortality in this population. We find that ignoring observed and unobserved health status leads one to conclude (misleadingly) that insurance may not be protective for HIV patients. After accounting for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, insurance does protect against premature death, but private insurance is more effective than public coverage. The better outcomes associated with private insurance are attributable to the more restrictive prescription drug policies of Medicaid.

Suggested Citation

Bhattacharya, Jayanta and Goldman, Dana P. and Sood, Neeraj, The Link between Public and Private Insurance and Hiv-Related Mortality (November 2002). NBER Working Paper No. w9346. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=353756

Jayanta Bhattacharya (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research ( email )

Center for Health Policy
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Stanford, CA 94305-6019
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Dana P. Goldman

RAND Corporation ( email )

P.O. Box 2138
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Neeraj Sood

University of Southern California ( email )

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United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

RAND Corporation ( email )

P.O. Box 2138
1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
United States

University of Southern California - Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics ( email )

635 Downey Way
Los Angeles, CA 90089-3333
United States

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