Some Observations on the British and German 3g Telecom Auctions
25 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2002
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Some Observations on the British and German 3g Telecom Auctions
Date Written: October 2002
Abstract
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G telecom auctions. Relative-performance maximisation may have been important, but the outcome of the British auction seems to have been efficient. This paper bundles my comments on two papers presented at the December 2001 CES Ifo conference on the telecom auctions. (For those readers new to the subject, I recommend first reading 'How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions' European Economic Review 2002 and 'The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses' Economic Journal 2002. Please contact the author for details.)
Keywords: auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, 3G, UMTS, bidding
JEL Classification: D44, L96
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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Some Observations on the British and German 3g Telecom Auctions
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