Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort

8 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2020

See all articles by John C. Coffee

John C. Coffee

Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Joshua Mitts

Columbia Law School

James D. Cox

Duke University School of Law

Peter Molk

University of Florida Levin College of Law

Edward Greene

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP

Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Meyer - Eisenberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Robert B. Thompson

Georgetown University Law Center

Colleen Honigsberg

Stanford Law School

Andrew Verstein

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown University Law Center

Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law School

Date Written: February 16, 2020

Abstract

Today, some hedge funds attack public companies for the sole purpose of inducing a short-lived panic which they can exploit for profit. This sort of market manipulation harms average investors who entrust financial markets with their retirement savings. While short selling serves a critical function in the capital markets, some short sellers disseminate negative opinion about a company, inducing a panic and sharp decline in the stock price, and rapidly close that position for a profit prior to the price partially or fully rebounding. We urge the SEC to enact two rules which will discourage manipulative short selling. The petition for rule-making on short and distort has been jointly signed by twelve securities law professors nationwide.

Keywords: Short, Distort, Law, Finance, Disclosure

Suggested Citation

Coffee, John C. and Mitts, Joshua and Cox, James D. and Molk, Peter and Greene, Edward and Thomas, Randall S. and Eisenberg, Meyer - and Thompson, Robert B. and Honigsberg, Colleen and Verstein, Andrew and Langevoort, Donald C. and Whitehead, Charles K., Petition for Rulemaking on Short and Distort (February 16, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538340 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3538340

John C. Coffee

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-2833 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

American Academy of Arts & Sciences

136 Irving Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Joshua Mitts (Contact Author)

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

James D. Cox

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7056 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

Peter Molk

University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States

Edward Greene

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP ( email )

One Liberty Plaza
New York, NY 10006
United States

HOME PAGE: http://Cgsh.com

Randall S. Thomas

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Meyer - Eisenberg

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Robert B. Thompson

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
(202) 661-6591 (Phone)

Colleen Honigsberg

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Andrew Verstein

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9832 (Phone)
202-662-9412 (Fax)

Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
72
Abstract Views
379
rank
350,406
PlumX Metrics