Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation
39 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2020
Date Written: February 2020
Abstract
We evaluate dynamic oligopoly estimators with laboratory data. Using a stylized en-try/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) and use the estimates to predict counterfactual behavior. The concern is that if the Markov assumption was violated one would mispredict counterfactual outcomes. The experimental method allows us to compare predicted behavior for counterfactuals to true counterfactuals implemented as treatments. Our main finding is that counterfactual prediction errors due to collusion are in most cases only modest in size.
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Estimating Dynamic Games of Oligopolistic Competition: An Experimental Investigation
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