Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams

38 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2020

See all articles by Brice Corgnet

Brice Corgnet

University of Saint Etienne - Analysis Group and Economic Theory Lyon St-Etienne (GATE-LSE)

Brian Gunia

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Roberto Hernán-González

Burgundy School of Business

Date Written: February 18, 2020

Abstract

We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to be embraced by workers than monitoring systems alone.

Keywords: Social Incentives, Social Pressure, Moral Hazard in Teams, Laboratory Experiments

JEL Classification: C92, D23, D91, M54

Suggested Citation

Corgnet, Brice and Gunia, Brian and Hernán-González, Roberto, Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams (February 18, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3540218 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3540218

Brice Corgnet (Contact Author)

University of Saint Etienne - Analysis Group and Economic Theory Lyon St-Etienne (GATE-LSE) ( email )

Lyon
France

Brian Gunia

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

Roberto Hernán-González

Burgundy School of Business ( email )

29 Rue Sambin
Dijon, 21000
France

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