A Model of Stock Buybacks

39 Pages Posted: 14 Mar 2020 Last revised: 25 Feb 2022

See all articles by Alvin Chen

Alvin Chen

Stockholm School of Economics | Swedish House of Finance

Date Written: February 19, 2020


This paper studies buybacks in a setting with two informed parties: a manager implementing buybacks for the firm and a speculator trading for themselves. Buybacks introduce two opposing economic forces. They intensify the competition for trading profits, making informed trading less profitable. They also make the per-share value of the firm higher (lower) when its shares are undervalued (overvalued); the increased dispersion makes informed trading more profitable. Less informative buybacks weaken the first effect while strengthening the second. Uninformed buybacks lower shareholder welfare. Managerial incentives to inflate the current stock price constrain the informativeness of buybacks. The model generates novel predictions linking managerial compensation, buybacks, and trading outcomes.

Keywords: share repurchases, stock buyback, liquidity, informed trading, payout policy, multi-trader Kyle model

JEL Classification: D82, G14, G30, G35

Suggested Citation

Chen, Alvin, A Model of Stock Buybacks (February 19, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541273 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3541273

Alvin Chen (Contact Author)

Stockholm School of Economics | Swedish House of Finance ( email )

SE-113 83 Stockholm

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