Mis-allocation Within Firms: Internal Finance and International Trade

69 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2020 Last revised: 23 Jun 2022

See all articles by Sebastian Doerr

Sebastian Doerr

Bank for International Settlements

Dalia Marin

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Davide Suverato

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)

Thierry Verdier

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2022

Abstract

This paper develops a novel theory of capital mis-allocation within firms that stems from managers' empire building and informational frictions within the organization. Introducing an internal capital market into a two-factor model of multi-segment firms, we show that international competition imposes discipline on managers and reduces capital mis-allocation across divisions, thereby lowering the conglomerate discount. The theory can explain why exporters exhibit a lower conglomerate discount than non-exporters (a new fact we establish). Testing the model's predictions with data on US companies, results suggest that Chinese import competition significantly reduces managers' over-reporting of costs and improves the allocation of capital within firms.

Keywords: Multi-Product Firms, Trade and Organization, Internal Capital Markets, Conglomerate Discount, China Shock

JEL Classification: F12, G30, L22, D23

Suggested Citation

Doerr, Sebastian and Marin, Dalia and Suverato, Davide and Verdier, Thierry, Mis-allocation Within Firms: Internal Finance and International Trade (June 1, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542214 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542214

Sebastian Doerr (Contact Author)

Bank for International Settlements ( email )

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Dalia Marin

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

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Germany
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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Davide Suverato

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) ( email )

Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
Munich, DE Bavaria 80539
Germany

Thierry Verdier

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) - Department of Economics ( email )

Rua Marques de Sao Vicente, 225/206F
Rio de Janeiro, RJ 22453
Brazil

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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