The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis

Pompeu Fabra University, Economics and Business Working Paper 1695, 2020

19 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2020 Last revised: 27 Sep 2021

See all articles by Benito Arruñada

Benito Arruñada

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona GSE

Date Written: February 23, 2020

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the main tradeoffs in the organization of public registries, comparing five forms of organization: (1) the bureaucracies or “discretionary expense centers” used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them, and the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees; (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are paid from the profit of an office; and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that hybrid forms allow market forces to play a more effective role in organizing public registries because they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible while, at the same time, reducing the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.

Keywords: Internal Markets, Competition, Bureaucracy, Registries, Welfare, Incentives, User Fees, User Choice, Privatization

JEL Classification: H11, H42, H51, H52, K23

Suggested Citation

Arruñada, Benito, The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis (February 23, 2020). Pompeu Fabra University, Economics and Business Working Paper 1695, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543024

Benito Arruñada (Contact Author)

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Department of Economics and Business
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 25 72 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~arrunada

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
61
Abstract Views
339
rank
486,559
PlumX Metrics