Privatizing Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis of Organizational Options

Pompeu Fabra University, Economics and Business Working Paper 1695, 2020

27 Pages Posted: 19 Mar 2020

See all articles by Benito Arruñada

Benito Arruñada

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business; Barcelona GSE

Date Written: February 23, 2020

Abstract

With a focus on public registries, this paper analyzes the organization of public registries comparing five organizational forms: (1) the bureaucratic expense centers used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them and the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees, (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are in addition paid with the profit of an office, and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that market forces may play a better role in organizing public registries when they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible and, at the same time, reduces the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.

Keywords: Internal Markets, Competition, Bureaucracy, Registries, Welfare, Incentives, User Fees, User Choice, Privatization

JEL Classification: H11, H42, H51, H52, K23

Suggested Citation

Arruñada, Benito, Privatizing Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis of Organizational Options (February 23, 2020). Pompeu Fabra University, Economics and Business Working Paper 1695, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3543024 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3543024

Benito Arruñada (Contact Author)

Pompeu Fabra University - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Department of Economics and Business
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 25 72 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.edu/~arrunada

Barcelona GSE ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

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