Macroprudential and Monetary Policies with an Imperfectly Competitive Banking Sector

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of bank competition on the optimal use of monetary and macroprudential policies. To this end, I develop a New Keynesian DSGE model with collateral constraints and an imperfect competitive banking sector. The results from the model demonstrate that the degree of competition in the banking sector has a sizable impact on the optimal mix of monetary and macroprudential policies. Specifically, the gains from a leaning-against-the-wind monetary policy are substantially smaller when the banking sector is less competitive. Results suggest that, from a policy perspective, monitoring the level of bank competition is crucial when the objective is to promote financial and economic stability.

Keywords: Monetary policy, Macroprudential policy, DSGE models, Financial frictions, Financial stability, Banking competition

JEL Classification: E32, E44, E52, E58, E61, G28