When Influencers Compete on Social Networks

40 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2020

See all articles by Christophe Bravard

Christophe Bravard

Jean Monnet University, Saint-Etienne - CREUSET

Jacques Durieu

University of Saint Etienne

Sudipta Sarangi

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Corinne Touati

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: February 20, 2020

Abstract

We study an opinion formation game between a Designer and an Adversary. While the Designer creates the network, both these players can influence network nodes (agents) initially, with ties being broken in favor of the Designer. Final opinions of agents are a convex combination of own opinions and the average network peer opinion. The optimal influence strategy shows threshold effects with non-empty equilibrium networks having star type architectures. By contrast, when the tie-breaking rule favors the Adversary, non-empty equilibrium networks are regular networks. The effect of random interactions between network nodes altering the network is also studied.

Keywords: Influential Players, Network Design

JEL Classification: D8, D7

Suggested Citation

Bravard, Christophe and Durieu, Jacques and Sarangi, Sudipta and Touati, Corinne, When Influencers Compete on Social Networks (February 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546523

Christophe Bravard

Jean Monnet University, Saint-Etienne - CREUSET ( email )

34, rue Francis Baulier
Saint-Etienne, 42023
France

Jacques Durieu

University of Saint Etienne ( email )

6, rue basse des rives
Saint Etienne, 42023
France

Sudipta Sarangi (Contact Author)

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University ( email )

250 Drillfield Drive
Blacksburg, VA 24061
United States

Corinne Touati

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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