Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments

23 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2020

See all articles by Aner Sela

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alex Krumer

University of St. Gallen

Reut Megidish

Sapir Academic College

Date Written: February 2020

Abstract

We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.

Suggested Citation

Sela, Aner and Krumer, Alex and Megidish, Reut, Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments (February 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14412, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547344

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Alex Krumer (Contact Author)

University of St. Gallen ( email )

St. Gallen
Switzerland

Reut Megidish

Sapir Academic College ( email )

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