Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments
23 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2020
Date Written: February 2020
We study round-robin tournaments with four symmetric players and two identical prizes where players compete against each other in games modeled as an all-pay contest. We demonstrate that in this common structure players may have an incentive to manipulate the results, namely, depending on the outcomes of the first round, a player may have an incentive to lose in the second round in order to maximize his expected payoff in the tournament.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sela, Aner and Krumer, Alex and Megidish, Reut, Strategic Manipulations in Round-Robin Tournaments (February 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14412, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547344
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